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ON SCIENCE AND

PHILOSOPHY^/

Harold D. Hantz
University of Arkansas
I
am sure that some of you are thinking that only
a philosopher would dare select a title so comprehensive, and even vague, as one "Cn Science and Philosophy." You are probably wondering whether or not
there can be anything definite concerning a topic
hope that I
this broad. Like you, I
shall have something more specific to say than the title might indicate. As a matter of fact, Ihad more specific
titles, some fancy, some plain, but none quite appropriate.
Finally I
gave up on titles, trusting
that if you were not driven away by the present one,
you would be pleased to find any specificity whatsoever, and the title would then be forgotton, or at
least forgiven.
My theme, then, is this: That the objectives of
scientific inquiry in itls best sense and of philosophic inquiry in its best sense are in many respects
identical; that in the intellectual history of Western civilization the union of scientific and philosophic inquiry has often provided its most fruitful
moments; and that separation of scientific inquiry
and philosophic inquiry (a separation which in our
day seems ever more acute) is perilous to both.
The initial step in exploring this theme consists
in making as precise as possible the meaning of the
expressions "scientific inquiry in its best sense"
and "philosophic inquiry in its best sense."
This
step might be put somewhat more loosely as definitions of "science" and "philosophy." The step is
y A paper read at a general meeting of the Arkansas
Academy of Science at the University of Arkansas, April 23, 1954.
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"Why not?" you ask, "For
surely every scientist knows what 'science 1 means
and every philosopher knows, or should know, what
mean
'philosophy' means." Let me illustrate what I
by the difficulty of definition here, beginning with
not even a definition of science in general, but one
branch of science, physics. The definition is taken
from a well-known textbook. (3) "Physics deals with
the properties and phenomena of inanimate matter as
affected by forces, and is especially concerned with
the properties common to all kinds of matter and
those changes of form and state which matter undergoes without being changed in kind, as well as such
general phenomena as sound, heat, electricity, and
magnetism."
Now the definition may be technically
sound, but it is pedagogically absurd. How many beginning students, for example, could do anything more
than parrot the words? The student should find this
definition meaningful at the close of the course,
but hardly at the beginning. I
cite this definition
to point to a difficulty, not only for exploring the
theme I
have chosen, but also in a larger sense for
communication among scientists and between scientists
and laymen. We are immersed in disparate disciplines
which become ever more technical.
How do we tell
the outsider what we are up to? Isn't this the way
the questions come: "You are a mathematician, now
"So you are a nuclear physiwhat ±s_ mathematics?"
cist. Fine, just what is nuclear physics all about?"
And so it goes. And what do we answer? We give the
kind of definition of "physics" above. I
have done
it many times for philosophy, myself. We have something pat, highly abstract, and generally meaningless to someone outside the field.
hope you will bear with me a little more on
I
this problem, for its implications for mutual understanding are important. Let me now take a definition
of "science" from a respectable book on logic and
scientific method by Cohen and Nagel. "We reserve

not an easy one to take.
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the term 'science' for knowledge which is , general
and systematic, that is, in which specific propositions are all deduced from a few general principles. "(1) At first blush this definition seems clear
enough and perhaps adequate insofar as such brevitycan ever be adequate for extensive disciplines such
as the sciences.
But a little reflection presents
certain stumbling blocks. By this definition St.
Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica is science.
The
knowledge there noted is general and systematic. He
deduces specific propositions, even to the adornment
of women and the economics of the market place, from
general principles. Yet today, a certain uneasiness
develops when a definition of "science" embraces at
once, without qualification, Thomas' Summa and Newton's Principia. Such a definition would seem to
slur over important distinctions between the two
works, and I
am alone in suspecting that
doubt that I
definition
requires
the
some clarification.
We are back where wa started without a definition.
It would be easy, but unprofitable here, to supply
other definitions presenting difficulties. In view
of .such difficulties we might ask after the tremendous burst of scientific investigation over the past
300 years providing a vast store of knowledge, why
is it so troublesome to state simply and clearly
suggest that one reason is this
what science is? I
very growth of a considerable variety of sciences
and that these sciences in turn are in varying stages
of development. Physics is much older than sociology
and possesses
a precision which the latter cannot
begin to approximate at the moment. Is it then possible to find a common core to the sciences such that
the term "science" can be used in any meaningful way
at all? With some recent writers the attempt is
abandoned altogether to the extent that even the expression "scientific method" is considered naive.
The new locution should rather be "scientific methods."
Before we too quickly accept this latest fad, I
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
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shall be old-fashioned enough to suggest that it is
still meaningful to speak of scientific method, and

that if it is meaningful to speak of scientific
method then the word "science" has significance at
least in terms of a basic unity of method. Today no
one, of course, will deny that the various sciences
need instruments, techniques, and theoretical constructs appropriate to their particular problems.
Clearly one of the retarding factors in the development of the social sciences was an almost blind aping
of physics in the 17th and 18th centuries, especially
as to approach and types of theory construction. The
ideal in the social sciences was the achievement of
a kind of social physics.
In more than one writer,
man was conceived as a social atom, motivated by
pure selfishness, enlighvarious imputed forces
tened self-interest, a social sympathy, or one of
these in common with reason, and so on, in much the
same way as physical atoms moved in terms of the law
of gravitation and the invariant laws of motion.
Fortunately this unhappy mimicry of physics has been
transcended.
But if it has been transcended, does
this mean that there is nothing in common between,
say, physics and sociology?
suggest that there are present in all scienI
tific investigations certain factors o r traits of
sufficient importance to warrant our speaking of a
common scientific method. What then are these common factors?
I
shall list them in one, two, three
fashion, but Ido not mean that they are so many
serial steps followed in every inquiry. They are
rather common traits. 2/
1. A problematic situation. The origin of scientific inquiry is in problematic situations, situations
of indeterminacy, perplexity, doubt.
It is these

—

=/

My indebtedness to methodological
Dewey will be obvious.

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol9/iss1/13

127

analyses of John

127

Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 13

ARKANSAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
which generate investigations. The investigator who
has no doubts, no questions, no perplexities, literally ceases to investigate.
Inquiry is at an end.
On the other hand, the seminal mind in a science is
the mind that in a sense flourishes on doubt, perplexities, questions leading to the formulation of
new problems. One of the prominent characteristics
that distinguishes science from religion, as religion
is frequently conceived, is precisely this search
for novelty in contrast witha passion for certainty.
There is, furthermore, a close relationship between
the determination of problematic situations and a
habit of mind of the scientist.
This habit is that
of holding his beliefs, even his most cherished and
confirmed beliefs in some degree of suspension.
Should this suspension become rigid, genuine inquiry
ceases.
2. The careful formulation of a definite problem
out of the problematic situation.
This factor consists of procedures utilized to transform an initially
perplexing, doubtful, indeterminate situation into
one of greater precision. The techniques are numerous and usually include such matters as the examination of procedures and the results of investigations
in allied problems and the search for significant
as opposed to irrelevant elements in the situation
under investigation.
3. The formulation of possible solutions to the
roblem or, in more sophisticated language, the development of hypotheses. The search may be brief or
lengthy. The first proposal may be successful, or
All this
many alternatives may fail in the tests.
is familiar. It is this element in the process which
is perhaps the focal point of the creative activity
of scientific inquiry. It is also here that the more
systematic a science becomes, the more the symbolic
formulation of hypotheses tends to be mathematical.
4. The testing of the hypotheses. From the 17th
century to the present day the insistence has been
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
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upon some sort of experimental situation for the
testing or confirmation of hypotheses.
If this experiential situation can be experimental, the actual
manipulation of the conditions of the problem, so
much the better. With the development of the experimental sciences, the testing is increasingly a function of instrumentation.
In an important way the
history of modern science is a function of the hisIn 1925 Whitehead commentory of instrumentation.
why
ted: "The reason
we are on a higher imaginative
scientists
level than earlier
is not because we have
imagination,
finer
but because we have better instruments. In science, the most important thing that
has happened during the last forty years is the advance in instrumental design. (10)
5. The systematic development of the logical consequences of hypotheses. Sometimes an hypothesis is
not directly testable; hence logical consequences
are deduced, usually mathematically, for the purpose
of finding testable situations.
Thus Galileo could
not test directly his hypothesis that the acceleration of a freely falling body was proportional to
the time of the fall. A logical consequence is that
the distance of the fallis proportional to the square
of the times. This proposition could be experimentally confirmed.
The situation was, of course, his
inclined-plane
experiment. Again, if an hyclassic
pothesis is confirmed in one instance, what other
consequences
can be developed to be tested?
As the
confirming tests increase, confidence in the adequacy
of the hypothesis grows.
Again, the five factors just described may, or
may not, occur in the order named.
The formulation
of a definite problem, the formulation of hypotheses,
the testing, the development of logical consequences
interpenetrate one another in the actual reflection
of the scientist as he goes about his work. But
these factors can be discerned in the analysis of
inquiry called scientific and constitute basic distinguishing traits of that inquiry.

"
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The end results of inquiry as here described yield
statements about "Comparative Effects of Total Body
and Tail Heating on the Peripheral Leukocyte Count
of the Rat," (7) or "The Effects of Wind-Drift of
Ueed- Killer or Some Puerto Rican Trees," (8) or "A
New Dense Crystalline Silica, "(9) or in other words,
that vast store of experientially verified propositions or the so-called factual information about the
physical, biological, and social world.
But scientific inquiry also yields statements of
a higher degree of generality than those just noted;
e.g., Galileo's Law of Falling Bodies, Boyle's Law of
Gases, Ohm's Law, and the like. (I realize the term
"law" is subject to criticism in contemporary methodological analyses. I
merely mention these hypotheses
they
usually
are
referred to in the literature.)
as
generality
comes in part from the large,
Their greater
perhaps indefinite, number of phenomena falling within the law.
Noting this matter of generality, we turn now to
a sixth trait or element in scientific inquiry: The
s earch for system and sometimes its achievement in
terms of a relatively few abstract hypotheses from
which propositions of less generality are deduced.
This is that aspect of science referred to previousD.y
as Cohen and Nagel's definition of "science." To
call it the meaning o r the nature of science seems
narrow, since this trait obviously is not present in
every scientific investigation.
It is more aptly
called the ideal of science.
A clue to this factor
as an ideal is that such systematization is found
only in the so-called advanced sciences.
As a matsuspect "advanced science" and "achieveter of fact, I
ment of systemat; zation" are equivalent expressions.
In the early nistory of modern science the illustration which leaps to mind of this sort of ideal of
of
science is Newton's Principia. There the
investigrtions in certain branches of physics and
of astronomy from Copernicus to Newton over a period
130
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systematization.
Because of this achievement Newton's name became in
the 17th to the end of the 19th century virtually
synonymous with science.
It is this same sort of
achievement of even a higher order of generality that
in our own day Einstein has accomplished, I
am told.
(I have to add the "I am told" for I
not
do
have the
technical equipment to understand the mathematics of
what he has accomplished.)
I
should like to read a
fairly lengthy quotation from Einstein on precisely
this matter of generality:

of 144 years received the consummate

Among the various pictures of the world
which are formed by the artist and the philosopher and the poet, what place does the worldpicture o f the theoretical physicist occupy?
Its chief quality must be scrupulous correctness and internal logical coherence, which only
the language of mathematics can express.
On
the other hand, the physicist has to be severe
and self-denying in regard to the material he
uses. He has to be content with reproducing
the most simple processes that are open to our
sensory experience, because the more complex
processes cannot be represented by the human
mind with the subtle exactness and logical sequence which are indispensable for the theoretical physicist.
Even at the expense of completeness, we have
to secure purity, clarity, and accurate correspondence between the representation and the
thing represented. When one realizes how small
a part of nature can thus be comprehended and
expressed in an exact formulation, while all
that is subtle and complex has to be excluded,
it is only natural to ask, what sort of attraction this work can have? Does the result
of such self-denying selection deserve the
high-sounding name of World-Picture?
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol9/iss1/13
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I
think it does; because the most general
laws on which the thought -structure of theoretical physics is built have to be taken into
consideration in studying even the simplest
events in nature. If they were fully known
one ought to be able to deduce from them by
means of purely abstract reasoning the theory
of every process of nature, including that of
life itself. I
mean theoretically, because in
practice such a process of deduction is entirely beyond the capacity of human reasoning.
Therefore the fact that in science we have to
be content with an incomplete picture of the
physical universe is not due to the nature of
the universe itself but rather to us.
Thus the supreme task of the physicist is
the discovery of the most general elementary
laws from which the world-picture can be deduced logically.
In every important advance
the physicist finds that the fundamental laws
are simplified more and more a s experimental
research advances. He is astonished to notice
how sublime order emerges from what appeared
to be chaos. (5)

..

This ultimate search for comprehensive order is what
I
referred to in my theme as "the objective of scientific inquiry in its best sense."
But now what are we going to do with philosophy
in this paper? I
have struggled so long in trying
point
to
to what seems to me to be the common eleinquiry that little time is left
of
scientific
ments
for philosophy. I
am sure that any one of you, the
practicing scientist, could have made wonderfully
clear in one-half or one-fourth the time just what
suspect that since I
the essence of science is. I
am
practicing
you
with
similar
philosopher
expect
a
me
dispatch to make wonderfully clear precisely what
philosophy is. And it is here that I
am embarrassed,
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
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must confess I
for I
do not find it easy to state
briefly the nature of philosophy.
Oh, it is easy
enough to toss off the pat definitions to which I
referred earlier. Philosophy is the love of wisdom.
Philosophy is seeing life steadily and seeing it
whole. But these vignettes require a world of elaboration, and thus we are back to our old difficulty.
I
can make quite clear, quite briefly, what I
think philosophy is not. Philosophy is not a system
of static beliefs. A man willof ten ask his neighbor,
"Well, just what is your philosophy of life?" Meaning frequently, what i
s that system o f last-stand
you
beliefs to which
will hold no matter what. In
this sense philosophy becomes identical with some
people's view of religion as a set of ultimate, unchallengeable beliefs. Philosophy may be
in fact,
it is in some of its branches --concerned with laststand beliefs, but it is not concerned with them in
this manner. For philosophy is preeminently a quest,
an inquiry.
What then is the nature of this quest? The best
answer to this question is the study of the history
of philosophy.
Since such a proper study would be
question
out of the
in so short a time as five or
ten minutes, I
shall have to indicate what my own
study finds characteristic of its history. I
think
philosophy in its best moments is a quest, an inquiry working toward a critical, systematic, and comprehensive view of man's experience.
Now "experience," as William James pointed out, is a doublebarreled word. It means both the objects of experience and the way we experience them. I
use "experience" here in this double-barreled sense.
Quite
obviously the objects of our experience are the totality of what we do experience:
the natural world
around us, the totality of culture with its complex
institutional framework, and our own internal experi"Incredible," you say, "that any man should
ence.
dare to embrace so much." Incredible it may be, but

—
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a few have so dared, and Ithink their daring has
been profitable for mankind. Very early in its history certain types of questions emerged as the most
persistent in this quest; questions which have prompted the development of, broadly speaking, three major
areas of philosophic inquiry: (a) Questions about
nature, producing metaphysics, the study of the most
pervasive characteristics
of nature;
©.•£•> space,
time, and causality, and cosmology or theories of
the development of the universe; (b) questions about
knowledge, which have led to studies, in the language
of Locke, of "the origin, certainty, and extent of
human knowledge," and to logic, the analysis of the
weight of evidence for our belief s ; and (c) questions
about values or what men consider worthwhile, leading
to ethics, the analysis of religious experience, and
to theories of art. The effort in the greatest of
the philosophers has been just this: In these fields
to examine critically the foundations of each, to attempt some systematic treatment within each, and to
undertake some comprehensive, systematic view of the
s this sort of
relations among these fields. It i
enterprise that in its history the greatest of the
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and
Kant, or on the contemporary scene, Whitehead, Russell, Santayana, and Dewey undertook. This is philosophy in its best sense.
What, then, has this conception of philosophy to
do with the theme of this paper? If I
have interpreted correctly the objectives of science and philosophy in their best senses, it should be clear that
they are identical in the search for comprehensive
order within man's experience.
The physical scientist takes a portion of that experience; e_.£. the
physical world, and in this selection his objective
is more restricted.
The philosopher undertakes to
understand the unity there achieved and to relate it
biological, social,
to other types of experience:
moral, religious, aesthetic. What the physical sci-

,
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entist achieves has always, and will always, influence profoundly the nature of the unity achieved by

the philosopher, for the exploration of the relation
between man and nature is one of the crucial philosophic problems.
Every philosopher worth his salt
has always tried to understand and appropriate the
best available knowledge of the natural world of his
can see no other road for a genuine philosoday. I
phy.
From what I
have just said, the idea might arise
that there is but a one-way path from science to
philosophy; that is, the scientist provides comprehensive unities which the philosopher employs, but
the philosopher has nothing to offer in return. I
have made
do not think this is the case. Actually I
claim
that
in
the
intellecmy
a second
in
theme
tual history o f Western civilization t he union of
scientific and philosophic inquiry has often provided its most fruitful moments.
I
believe this concan
abundantly,
tention
be documented
but Ishall
illustrate briefly only from ancient Greece and the
17th century.
It was in ancient Greece that the enterprises of
philosophy and science, as we have come to know them,
were born; born, one might say, as twins. The history of Western philosophy began about 600 B.C. with
a group o f Greek philosophers who wrote "about Nature." What is it they sought? They sought to understand the material basis of the universe and the
energizing forces that are responsible for the ceaseless change that takes place. Here was formulated
at least the clear notion of a universe, the idea of
a comprehensive order. The theories were naive, but
this idea is not naive, and within two-hundred years
Domecritus stated the not so naive theory that the
universe consists only of atoms in motion governed
by inexorable laws. I
am sure that Democritus would
have felt very much at home in 1687, the year Newton's
Principia was published.

—
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A second extravagant speculation, but of the most
profound importance for the entire history of science,
was the Fythagorean notion that number i
s the keyto nature. The Pythagoreans were bewitched by their
controlling idea and readily generated a numerical
magic, but their faith that nature is through and
through a mathematical order was to work later a
kind of magic inmodern science. Plato readily adopted the notion and made ita cardinal element in his
theory of knowledge and theory of nature.
It was
this Plato, poet mathematician, philosopher, who was
to contribute to the birth of modern science by being a factor in the transmission of this mathematical
faith. In the Italian Renaissance, there was a strong
revival of Platonism, and through it impetus was given
to the search for mathematical relationships in nature. Galileo himself says:
Here /in his collected works/ will be perceived from innumerable examples what is the
use of mathematics for judgment in the natural
sciences and how impossible it is to philosophize correctly without the guidance of Geometry, as the wise maxim of Plato has it True
philosophy expounds nature to us; but she can
be understood only by him who has learned the
speech and symbols in which she speaks to us.
This speech is mathematics, and its symbols
are mathematical figures. Philosophy is written in this greatest book, which continually
stands open here to the eyes of all, but cannot be understood unless one first learns the
language and characters in which it is written. This language is mathematics, and the
characters are triangles, circles, and other
mathematical figures." (6)
A third illustration of the intimate tie between
science and philosophy in their early years was a
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956
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Greek discovery which lies at the heart of the verypossibility of both. It was the Greek philosophers
who discovered discourse, and Aristotle more than
any other at that time who systematized this discovery. What does the discovery of discourse mean? It
was the Greeks who found that the pushes and pulls
of nature could be transmuted into discourse which
then has meaning in terms o f the actual events out
It is disof which the discourse is generated.
course, statements, propositions, which are seen to
have meaning and to be true or false. Events are not
true or false. And it is our statements and propositions a s they are systematized
and tested which
constitute the heart of science.
This the Greeks
clearly saw, a discovery which Dewey calls the greatest single discovery of man. Logos, the word, discourse, is then itself made an object of study to
provide us with logic, and within this general study
the first careful treatment of the idea of science
as system is found in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
I
shall turn to only one more example in classical
Greece of the tie between philosophy and science.
Aristotle, I
suppose, is the best example at that
time of scientist and philosopher. Few people, sometimes even in philosophy, seem to realize that Aristotle wrote on biology more than on any other subject
matter. Historians of science are wont to call him
the father of biology. No less a biologist than Larwin commented, "Cuvier and Linnaeus have been my two
gods, though in very different ways, but they were
"
mere schoolboys to old Aristotle. (2) But we can
not pause to examine why these encomia are made.
One of the rare occasions when Aristotle, the dispassionate writer, shows any sign o f emotion is in
a passage at the close of the first book of a work,
On the Parts of Animals, in which he eloquently urges
the study o f animal and plant life
The influence
of Aristotle's work in biology upon his total philosophy was profound. It permeates, for example, his

.

¦i-J
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ethics, one of the finest statements ofa naturalistic ethic that has ever been written. Man is a perfectly natural, not a supernatural creature, Aristotle
argues. In terms of this natural basis and the fact
that he possesses intelligence to a higher degree
than the other animals, what is the good life for man?
Those who pursue science as a naturalistic undertaking, but put man in a separate non-natural category
for his moral behavior, would do well to read this
challenge to their supernaturalistic assumptions.
Well, I
have come here not to praise the Greeks,
but to illustrate the virtual union o f science and
philosophy, as they were born in Western culture.
The union persisted in the social sciences until recent date and still does in some respects down to
the present.
It continued with the physical scienthink
ces I
at least until Newton. Galileo fought
with more than one philosophy professor of his day,
usually to the discredit of the philosophy professor,
but Ithink the argument was not about science as
against philosophy, but what was correct in philosophy. It seems he argues in this way:
Does not
philosophy have something to do with the advancement
of knowledge? Scholastic philosophy has become sterile in its blind obedience to authority. Correct
philosophy is to be found in getting on with the
study of nature, a view, interestingly enough, that
Aristotle pushed hard in the first book of his Metaphysics

.

The union between the scientist and the philosopher in the 17th century was often so close as to be
virtually indistinguishable.
Descartes, you will
remember, invented analytical geometry. He saw this
invention as an illustration of a new method of philosophizing which he would apply to all of man's experience. This method is described in his Discourse
on Method and is further illustrated in his Principles
of Philosophy, a work on a theory of nature.
His
mathematical discovery he did not see as something
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1956

138

138

Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 9 [1956], Art. 13

ON SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
separate

from his philosophizing. Galileo was never

more critical of scholastic philosophy than Descartes;
yet curiously enough there is the common notion that
Galileo fits into the history of science and not
philosophy whereas Descartes fits into the history
of philosophy and not, or only secondarily, in scisuspect they both belong in both streams.
ence. I
Descartes
most speculative hypothesis was his mechanical view of nature. This is, of course, a revival
of the Democratean view: Nature is composed only of
matter in motion, operating in terms of invariant
laws. This is the view that has given Descartes'
name to what some historians call the Cartesian Revolution. The history of modern science until the latter part of the l°th century seemed documentary proof
of the hypothesis.
It was Newton, of course, who
provided evidence for this view in a way that Descartes never accomplished.
Newton's work is so frequently referred to by a
single word of its title, Principia, Isometimes
think that, ifnot the title, then certainly the significance, has been forgotten. You will recall it,
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica; i,.£.
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. What
did Newton mean by this title? Perhaps it was an
accident. Perhaps Newton didn't really know what he
meant. Or perhaps it means what it says, that he is
dealing with the mathematical principles of natural
philosophy, or as he himself says in his introduction, "Ihave in this treatise cultivated mathematics
as far as it relates to philosophy." (4) What the
early Greek philosophers had dreamed about a theory
of nature which would make intelligible the great
ebb and flow of things in nature, is now realized in
a language they could not yet know, a highly developed
mathematics, and with evidence that required the patient observation of numerous individuals. A general
theory of nature; yes, a science of nature had now
been achieved.
What remains is primarily the com-

'

,

,
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pletion of the details, an undertaking which seems
to have been the primary occupation of the energies
of physical scientists during the 18th and well into the 19th century untilnew evidence within physics
required reexamination of the basis of the Newtonian
Theory. You will note this reexamination and reformulation came from no promptings and virtually no
help from within the philosophic fraternity.
"Why is this so? The reasons probably are numerous, but one clearly is a product of the 19th century. If the 19th century did not invent, at least
it fostered, specialization of inquiry ina way never
known before.
The advancement of knowledge turned
The results
into a kind of assembly-line process.
have been both a blessing and a curse. Items, one
might almost say atoms of knowledge have proliferated
at an unbelievable rate. But high specialization
has fostered an insularity such that one social scientist can hardly talk to another of different breed,
let alone to a physical scientist. Except in physical theory, the systematic organization of large
areas of experience seems not only to lag, but even
to be shunned. The same trend has operated in philosophy.
The men in 20th century philosophy I
mentioned earlier are all dead except Russell; and he
suppose, the peak of his imaginative
has passed, I
production.
Where are the young men in philosophy
who dare to see man's experience steadily and wholly?
They haven't spoken yet. For one thing, I
can see
no adequate philosophy without an adequate theory of
nature, and it is a plain fact that most philosophers
today do not know enough about contemporary physical
should be the first to confess this ignotheory. I
rance.
On the other hand an adequate theory of nature is not an adequate philosophy of life because,
fortunately or unfortunately, man is a moral and
aesthetic creature besides a thinking creature. The
spectacle of certain scientists
who have suddenly
become excited about the consequences o f the atom
140
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bomb and turned moral philosophers, has not been an
encouraging one. The world did not have to wait for
the atom bomb to raise the question of the relation
between man's knowledge and his moral beliefs. The
question has been explored and clarified over a period of twenty-five-hundred years in Western philosophy. Why not be aware of and use that analysis?
What then would seem to be the lesson in this predicament?
I
have tried to show that the objectives
of scientific inquiry in its best sense and of philosophy in its best sense have much in common; that
in the intellectual history o f the West the interpenetration of science and philosophy has provided
some of its most fruitful moments.
Would not the
lesson seem to be that somehow, as scientists and
philosophers, we must disenthrall ourselves?
That
somehow we must rise above our specialties for the
enhancement and enlargement of one another's minds
in the pursuit of what seems to be a common objective
to understand nature and man's place in it.

—
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